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I. Problems Encountered in Marketing Gas
A. Failure to Market Due to Depressed Market Conditions
1. Producers without contracts have experienced low price offers or 
lack of market
2. Producers with contracts have encountered refusals to take or 
pay, or demands to market out or renegotiate contracts
B. Changing Structure of Gas Market
1. Rise of the "spot market" and casual sales of gas
2. Producer’s access to pipelines to transport gas directly to dis- 
tributors and end users
II. The Effect of Marketing on the Habendum Clause: Maintaining the Oil and 
Gas Lease during the Secondary Term
A. Marketing is required to satisfy the secondary term requirement of 
production in paying quantities, Standolind Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937, error ref'd). See, 
generally, H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil & Gas Law § 604.1 for a 
citation to the cases.
1. Constructive Production; Shut-in Gas Royalty
Shut-in gas royalty evolved in the 1930's to permit lessee to 
satisfy the secondary term requirement when no actual market 
existed for gas. Shut-in gas royalty is paid in lieu of royalty 
as "constructive production". Lowe, Shut-In Royalty Payments, 5 
Eastern Min. L. Inst. § 18-02 (1984).
2. Maintaining the lease during the secondary term by shut-in gas 
royalty clause
a. Shut-in well must be capable of producing gas in paying 
quantities, Pray v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 233 Kan. 351, 
662 P.2d 255 (1983).
e pli ut arket : ne on' t  
 
r f r hill . orvell
niversit r a s ol ye tevill  
e count r arketi a  
ai arket epres arket onditi  
. cer it t tr t r o r r
arket 
. r cer it tr t nt l
, a arket t oti t tr t  
. ha gi t a arket 
. i t arket l  
r ucer' i l a rt i t i
ib r  
ff t arketi a um l se: aintai il
a e r ar m 
. arketi i erm re t
ct i antiti s, t l il a o. .
arnhill, . . i . pp. , f' ). e,
erall , . ill a  . eyers, il  a a § .
io s. 
. onstr ct r ucti ; ut- a oyalt  
ut- l l 0'  r it
t erm re t t l arket
i s. ut-i l i ie al
st t ucti ". e, ut- oyalt ents,
ast in. . st.   4). 
. aintai r erm t
l  
. ut- ell ust l i i
antiti s, . ier t eu , ., an. ,
2 3). 
- 2 -
b. Failure to properly pay shut-in gas royalties
Traditional theory provided that if the shut-in gas royalty 
clause was drafted as a "special limitation", the failure to 
properly pay shut-in gas royalties during the secondary term 
results in lease termination. Also, if the shut-in gas 
royalty clause was drafted as an obligation, i.e., a cove- 
nant, failure to properly pay such payments only incurs 
liability for damages. See, E. Kuntz, The Law of Oil and 
Gas, 46.3 (1972). Contra, Lowe, supra, 18.03, 18.04.
B. Marketing is not required to satisfy the secondary term requirement 
of production in paying quantities: The implied covenant to market 
within a reasonable time. McVicker v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 322 
P.2d 410 (Ok. 1958); See, also H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra § 
604.1.
1. Lease does not terminate ipso facto, or by express terms, at the 
end of the primary term by the lessee's failure to market; and, 
the obligation to market is implied with the lessee having a 
reasonable time after discovery to comply with such covenant. 
McVicker v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, Id.
a. failure to exercise due diligence to market will result in 
lease termination, Townsend v. Creekmore-Rooney Co., 358 
P.2d 1103 (Ok. 1960).
b. failure to market within a reasonable time, despite exercise 
of due diligence, results in lease termination, McVicker v. 
Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410 (Ok. 1958).
c. exercising due diligence and marketing within reasonable 
time depends upon facts and circumstances of each case, Id. 
See also, Gazin v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 367 
P.2d 1010 (0k. 1961).
2. The effect of shut-in gas royalty on the implied covenant to 
market within a reasonable time
a. The inclusion of a shut-in gas royalty clause does not 
displace the implied obligation to market within a reaso- 
nable time but constitutes an additional fact, i.e., the 
payment of consideration while gas is not being marketed, to 
be considered along with the other facts and circumstances 
to determine if the lessee has exercised due diligence in 
attempting to market or has marketed within a reasonable 
time. Thus, the payment of shut-in gas royalties decreases 
the likelihood of lease termination resulting from a breach 
of the implied obligation to market. E. Kuntz, supra, § 
46.1.
b. Failure to timely pay shut-in gas royalties pursuant to 
clause requiring such payment to maintain lease during 
secondary term in absence of production does not result in 
lease termination, Gard v. Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1311 (0k. 1978).
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C. Recent marketing problems raised by the shut-in-gas royalty clause
1. Failure to sale due to poor price
Shut-in gas royalty clause applicable only to absence of market;
a. Literal interpretation of shut-in gas royalty clauses,
Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 171 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.
1943).
b. Absence of market shut-in gas royalty clause should be 
construed to confer discretion on lessee to determine 
whether given offer constitutes adequate "market", Pierce, 
Lessor/Lessee Relations in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38 Oil & 
Gas Inst. § 8.02 (Matthew Bender 1987).
c. Risk of losing lease in a jurisdiction which requires actual 
marketing to satisfy the secondary term, Pierce, supra.
2. Maintaining a lease by shut-in gas royalty payments when price 
offered precludes production in paying quantities
Reasonable basis for future profitable operations based on 
expected changes in market conditions should be sufficient to 
satisfy shut-in gas royalty clause. See, e.g., Barby v. Singer, 
648 P.2d 14 (Ok. 1982). Also, see Pierce, supra, 8.02.
III. The Implied Covenant to Market
A. The Prima Facie Case
1. Discovery of gas on the leased premises
2. Failure to market the discovered gas
3. Ability to market the hydrocarbons if the lessee had complied 
with the relevant standard of conduct
4. Damages proximately caused by the lessee's breach of the relevant 
standard of conduct
For citations to the cases enunciating the requirements for the 
prima facie case, see see, generally, H. Williams & C. Meyers,
Oil & Gas Law § 855 et seq.
B. The identity of interest between lessor and lessee as to marketing
Typically the sale of gas encompasses the entire leasehold interest 
including the lessee's working interest and the royalty share.
Thus, ordinarily the interests of the lessor and lessee will 
coincide; both desire the best sale available. See generally, H. 
Williams & C. Meyers, supra § 856.3 et seq.
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C. The effect of Payment of Shut-In Gas Royalties on the Marketing Cove-
nant.
Payment of shut-in gas royalties does not avoid lessee’s obliga- 
tion to market within a reasonable time, Pray v. Premier Petro- 
leum, Inc., 233 Kan. 351, 662 P.2d 255 (1983).
D. The Implied Covenant to Market in Action.
1. Failure to market at best price obtainable: Piney Woods Country 
Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Miss. 1982) 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 726 F.2d 225 (5th 
Cir. 1984), reh. denied, 750 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1005, 105 S.Ct.1868 (1985). But see, Amoco 
Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 570 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979) error ref'd n.r.e. 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
2. Failure to diligently market gas: Baby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F.
Supp. 188 (W.D. Ok. 1981) (dilatoriness in renegotiating expired 
gas purchase contract).
3. Dedication of gas to pre-existing gas purchase contract providing 
for less than market value sale price and lacking annual redetermi- 
nation clause, with lessee receiving collateral benefit for such 
dedication: Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 570 S.W.2d 
280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) error ref'd n.r.e. 611 S.W.2d 610
(Tex. 1980).
4. Sale to Wholly Owned Subsidiary at Below Market Price: Parker v.
TX0 Production Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 
1986); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 
-Texarkana 1984, writ granted).
5. Failure to Include a Price Redetermination Clause in Gas Sale Con-
tract: Davis v. CIG Exploration Inc., 789 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. Tex. 
1986); Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. 
Supp. 957 (S.D. Miss. 1982) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and 
remanded, 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir 1984), reh. denied, 750 F.2d 69 
(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005, 105 S.Ct. 1868 
(1985).
6. Failure to Market at Intrastate Rates: Cabot Corp v. Brown, 716 
S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App. - Corpus Chriti 1986).
7. Failure to notify lessor prior to execution of oil and gas lease 
that gas will be sold at a set price pursuant to a previously nego- 
tiated gas purchase contract: Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Harris,
284 Ark. 270, 681 S.W.2d 317 (1984).
8. Lessee's Duty to Assure Payment to Lessor: Cook v. Tompkins, 713 
S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App. Eastland 1986)
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D. The Search for the Proper Standard of Conduct: "Second Guessing the 
Lessee's Business Judgment"
1. The Prudent Operator Standard
2. Good Faith
3. The Fluctuating Standard
For a discussion f the cases and the commentator's views on the 
proper standard of conduct, see, Kramer & Pearson, The Implied 
Marketing Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases: Some Needed Changes 
for the 80's, 46 La. L. Rev. 787, 809 (1986).
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